Chapter 3 From domestic to regional to global: factory Africa and factory Latin America? by Nadim Ahmad & Annalisa Primi
Chapter 3 From domestic to regional to global:
factory Africa and factory Latin America?
権利 Copyright OECD
journal or
publication title
Global value chain development report 2017 :
measuring and analyzing the impact of GVCs on
economic development
page range 69-95
year 2017
章番号 Chapter 3
URL http://hdl.handle.net/2344/00049247
69
CHAPTER
From domestic to regional to global: 
Factory Africa and Factory Latin America?
NADIM AHMAD AND ANNALISA PRIMI
G lobal value chains (GVCs) have been drivers of growth in developed and emerging economies for many years, perhaps best characterized by China’s experience. Export-driven growth is about gen-
erating higher overall value added, employment, and income 
through more efficient (and, ideally, higher productivity) pro-
duction. The process of generating higher value added is typi-
cally referred to as upgrading. But the scale of integration within 
GVCs has varied, with many low-income countries, particularly in 
Sub- Saharan Africa, integrating only at the primary (commodity) 
part of the value chain, with little diversification or upgrading to 
higher value-added activities. And unlike most other regions — 
particularly Europe, North America, and Southeast Asia — Sub- 
Saharan Africa and, to a lesser extent, South America show little 
intraregional integration. In part, that reflects thick borders that 
add to trade costs, especially in landlocked African economies, 
but it also reflects a “spaghetti bowl” of regional trade agree-
ments.1 Better trade facilitation measures — such as establishing 
a single window for customs clearance, reducing tariffs, improv-
ing transport and logistics — are policy levers that governments 
can pull to deepen regional and global connectivity within value 
chains and to facilitate upgrading within firms.
The development of the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development–World Trade Organization (OECD–
WTO) Trade in Value-Added database, and similar initiatives 
such as the World Input- Output Database, have transformed 
the ability to understand integration and assess the benefits of 
integration into GVCs. But while the literature on GVCs has gen-
erated a rich new vocabulary that describes the various forms 
of upgrading, the terms can in turn be misunderstood. At least 
on the surface, the various forms of upgrading have also pre-
sented a conundrum to policymakers. The evidence reveals the 
importance of having access to cheap and efficient imports for 
exports. In most countries and industries around the world, the 
foreign content of exports has risen considerably over the past 
two decades. But upgrading can also involve the development 
of strong domestic upstream supply chains to exporting firms. 
In simple terms, therefore, the policy conundrum is whether to 
emphasize increasing the foreign content or the domestic con-
tent of exports.
This chapter provides a brief overview of upgrading and 
GVC terminologies, providing insights on interpretability pit-
falls. It offers evidence of the complementarities between strong 
domestic supply chains and imports and then demonstrates the 
importance of strong regional value chains for integration at 
a global level. And to illustrate the complementarities, it ends 
with examples of broad and targeted policies that countries are 
implementing for the motor vehicle value chain.
What is upgrading?
The concept of upgrading has its origins in international trade 
theory, where it indicates a shift toward the production of higher 
value goods. But with the increasing international fragmentation 
of production, the definition has incorporated the notion that 
goods are produced through a combination of specific tasks 
within a value chain, each generating a proportion of the good’s 
overall value. This has given rise to the term “moving up the 
value chain,” whereby firms upgrade by engaging in a task within 
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the value chain that extracts a higher share of the overall value of 
the good (higher value added), typically referred to as functional 
upgrading.
Functional upgrading
Functional upgrading is usually associated with higher labor 
productivity, since the move to a higher value part of the chain 
typically (but not always) requires higher skills. Notwithstand-
ing the high correlation between productivity growth and profit 
growth, profit remains the primary driver for where firms position 
themselves in the value chain. From the perspective of the firm, 
upgrading may involve a move to a part of the value chain where 
relative labor productivity is lower but profits are higher. Indeed, 
a firm may take a lower overall part of the value of the final good 
at the end of the chain (even if overall sales of the final good 
remain unchanged). That is one reason why care is needed when 
deriving messages on upgrading using data on the domestic 
value-added content of output.
Upgrading also has implications for social cohesion and over-
all economic growth. Thus the country perspective on upgrading 
may differ from the firm perspective, a point often overlooked. 
Upgrading can result in higher profits and higher employment 
creation for the firm but lower overall productivity and lower 
overall GDP. For a country, however, the driver for functional 
upgrading is to increase GDP, as well as labor productivity and 
employment. Government intervention to ensure that upgrading 
occurs in a way that incentivizes the firm to upgrade to a higher 
skilled (higher labor productivity) part of the value chain can thus 
affect outcomes. For example, high tariffs on imports of capi-
tal goods could push firms to activities with low capital intensity 
(typically low labor productivity) and thus with lower domestic 
value added in order to maximize profits.
Partly for these reasons, care is needed in interpreting the 
“smile curve” developed by Acer’s CEO Stan Shih to illustrate 
the position of Chinese Taipei in the electronics value chain. The 
smile curve accurately describes the decomposition of value of a 
given product into the underlying stages (tasks) of production (at 
least for typical manufactured products; figure 3.1). But it does 
not follow that firms will necessarily seek to position themselves 
in tasks at the extreme ends of the curve, typically those that 
extract a higher share of the overall value.
The same holds for the national perspective. Countries clearly 
would like firms to position themselves at the higher value ends 
of the curve, since these are typically the tasks associated with 
higher labor productivity, but other considerations are also in 
play. Countries with a focus on higher social inclusion and lower 
inequality, for example, may want firms to position themselves 
in the higher employment part of the curve, particularly if that 
is where they have a comparative advantage and if doing so 
results in high volumes of output — recall that where to position 
along the value chain is as much a volume game (sales) as a ratios 
game (share of overall value). In addition, a low share of the over-
all value of a product does not necessarily equate with low pro-
ductivity. There are examples of specialized and capital-intensive 
niche activities with high labor productivity in the manufacturing 
part of the value chain. Indeed, in many OECD economies, labor 
productivity is typically higher in manufacturing (often the low 
value part of the smile curve) than in business services (typically 
at the extreme ends; figure 3.2).
Functional upgrading goes beyond existing firms moving to 
different parts of the value chain. In a national context, it can also 
occur as new firms enter the market, often through new supply 
chains driven by lead firms (generally foreign affiliates) that pro-
vide (easier) indirect access to international markets for these 
new (upstream) entrants. Additional value is thus created through 
upstream domestic supply chains. Lead firms can also encourage 
incumbents to upgrade through process and product upgrading 
facilitated by technology and human capital spillovers from the 
lead firms. Typically, this process results in higher overall domes-
tic value-added content of exports within a specific value chain 
as new entrants and incumbents, capitalizing on comparative 
advantages (such as proximity), displace less competitive foreign 
imports. This process highlights the one-time complementarity 
between importing for exports and eventually creating upstream 
supply chains.
The data point to this type of upgrading for textiles in China, 
although not unambiguously, as the data may also point to other 
forms of upgrading, including the more general case of func-
tional upgrading.2 For example, the foreign content of China’s 
textile exports fell from 43% in 1995 to 26% in 2011. Some of 
that content was displaced by the Chinese textiles industry, but 
by far the biggest contributor was the Chinese service sector, 
which displaced upstream foreign services providers (figure 3.3). 
Indeed, the Chinese textile industry’s contribution to the value 
of gross textile exports remained broadly steady (suggesting 
limited classic functional upgrading in the firm or sector), but its 
share of domestic value added in textile exports fell from just 
under 50% in 1995 to just over 40% in 2011, as Chinese firms 
began to occupy other parts of the GVC for textiles.
FIGURE 3.1 The smile curve of the global value chain, 
1970s and 2000s
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Source: Author’s analysis based on Shih 1996 and Gereffi, Humphrey, and 
Sturgeon 2005.
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Product upgrading
Another mechanism for upgrading is by producing higher value 
products (product upgrading), as the firm seeks to increase prof-
its through sales of higher value products rather than moving to 
a different part of the value chain. This typically manifests itself 
as higher domestic value-added content through price rather 
than displacement (of imports) effects, as well as higher labor 
productivity. The aggregated Trade in Value-Added database–
type measures of trade make it difficult to observe this type of 
upgrading. But analyses of detailed merchandise trade statistics 
can provide insights — for example, by looking at the (growing) 
diversification of products (and relative unit value prices) within a 
particular product group and country.
Process upgrading
Process upgrading typically refers to improved production meth-
ods that more efficiently transform intermediate inputs into 
final products, particularly through innovations in the produc-
tion process or new technologies (see, for example, Humphrey 
and Schmitz, 2000, 2002, 2004). In theory, this type of upgrad-
ing should also generate higher domestic value content of pro-
duction and higher labor productivity, since fewer intermediate 
FIGURE 3.2 Labor productivity: Manufacturing relative to business services in selected Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development countries, 2010
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FIGURE 3.3 China’s exports of textiles, by origin of value added, 1991 and 2011
Percent
0
10
20
30
40
20111995201119952011199520111995
ServicesOther industryTextilesAgriculture
Foreign
China
Source: Author’s analysis based on Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development–World Trade Orgnization Trade in Value-Added database.
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inputs are needed, especially if the innovations are related to 
knowledge-based capital that allows for higher rent extraction. 
Again, this can manifest itself as upgrading in upstream domestic 
suppliers that respond to competition from foreign producers.
Intersectoral upgrading
Another common form of upgrading is intersectoral, extracting 
higher value by entering new product value chains. For example, 
Chinese Taipei used its competence in producing televisions to 
make monitors and eventually (through functional upgrading) to 
make computers (Humphrey and Schmitz 2002).
Integration for growth: Imports for exports
The ability of firms to organize production processes into dis-
crete tasks has transformed the nature of trade and the scope 
for firms (and countries) to participate in global production net-
works. This reorganization of global production has opened 
opportunities not only for multinational companies and leading 
exporting firms in advanced economies, but also for firms in 
emerging and developing economies. Firms in advanced econ-
omies are able to outsource to more cost-competitive countries, 
while emerging and developing economies can enter GVCs by 
taking advantage of a new tradable commodity in which they 
have comparative advantages — namely labor.
This is intuitive for firms that are able to source cheaper inputs, 
but concerns remain that the reallocation of resources induced 
by such changes may work imperfectly. Although debate con-
tinues on the benefits of trade for economic growth, the grow-
ing body of evidence points to a positive relationship between 
increases in imported intermediates and increases in competi-
tiveness and indeed in exports at a broader level. This positive 
association has been demonstrated to occur through two chan-
nels: through the use of a greater variety of intermediates (also 
more competitively priced) and through technology transfers 
embodied in the imported products, which is also seen in the 
greater boost to productivity through imports from developed 
economies (Bas and Strauss-Kahn 2014). Similarly, a positive rela-
tionship has been found between imports and GDP, though with 
gains distributed unevenly across sectors (Kummritz 2014).
Further evidence of a positive relationship comes from a 
study using OECD–WTO Trade in Value-Added database data 
on foreign and domestic value added embodied in exports that 
relates changes in domestic value added in exports to struc-
tural and policy factors (Kowalski and Lopez-Gonzalez 2016; see 
annex 3.1 for a full description of the variables and data sources).3 
The study controls for structural determinants using the ratio of 
capital to labor, the intensity of skill, and the country’s relative 
productivity. The policy determinants are the quality of domes-
tic institutions, revealed investment openness, and trade policy 
stance. To identify the role of foreign inputs, the study takes 
foreign value added (by sector) to produce exports but with a 
temporal lag to avoid mechanical associations or reverse cau-
sality with the dependent variable.4 The study also includes a 
measure of geographic spillovers from neighboring countries 
(the distance-weighted domestic value added in final demand of 
partner countries) and a measure of domestic demand linkages, 
which help control for the size of the economy (captured indi-
rectly through the domestic value added used for final domestic 
consumption).5
Strong domestic supply chains and strong international 
supply chains drive export growth
Demand linkages with the domestic economy, proxied through 
the domestic value added of a sector in domestic demand, is 
the most significant determinant of growing domestic value 
added in exports for both developed and emerging economies 
(figure 3.4). But foreign value added used in the production of 
exports is the second most significant component in developed 
economies and the third most significant in emerging econo-
mies, clearly illustrating the complementary nature of imports 
for export growth. For example, in emerging economies a 1 per-
centage point increase in the import content of exports trans-
lates into roughly a 0.1 percentage point increase in the value 
of exported domestic value added. Distance to economic activ-
ity (measured as the distance-weighted domestic value added 
in the final demand of partner countries) is also an important 
determinant of value added in exports. But it is almost twice as 
important in emerging economies as in developed economies, 
possibly capturing the constraints imposed from less devel-
oped transportation networks. Tariffs, even if low, also have an 
impact in developed economies and marginally (albeit not sta-
tistically significant) in emerging economies (see table A3.1.1 in 
annex 3.1).
Not all drivers affect emerging and developed economies 
equally
There are also some differences in significant factors between 
emerging and developed economies.6 For example, the pro-
duction of more sophisticated products (even though this may 
capture only insertion in processing parts of the value chain) is 
associated with growing domestic value added in exports in 
emerging economies only, while skill intensities are significant in 
developed economies only, likely reflecting the differing nature 
of integration between the two types of economies (see figure 
3.4). Increases in capital–labor ratios are also an important deter-
minant in emerging economies but not in developed economies. 
On the surface, this may point to low wages as an important 
determinant of integration in emerging economies, but the result 
is more nuanced.
Capital–labor ratios can also be loosely proxied by the 
inverse of unit labor costs, which in turn reflect the ratio of aver-
age compensation costs divided by average productivity.7 The 
covariance with productivity may partly explain why productivity 
on its own was not a significant determinant for emerging econ-
omies. But the key point is that it is not average wages alone 
that determine integration in emerging economies but the com-
bination of wages and productivity. And the higher the unit labor 
costs (the lower the capital–labor ratio), the lower the degree of 
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export-driven growth (and in turn integration). This result may 
in part explain why economies with an abundance of unskilled 
cheap labor still struggle to integrate in GVCs, despite rising 
wages in other parts of the world. For example, despite a four-
fold increase in average wages in China between 2000 and 2010, 
its unit labor costs (at the economy level) were little changed and 
remained significantly below those in most economies in Africa 
(table 3.1). And Sub- Saharan African economies that generally 
saw little change in average wages between 2000 and 2010 still 
had high unit labor costs relative to other countries (figure 3.5).
Nor do the drivers affect all sectors equally
A similar pattern emerges at the sectoral level, but the impor-
tance of foreign inputs for manufacturing exports is more stark 
(figure 3.6), while domestic (demand) linkages are most impor-
tant for the services sector (reflecting the importance of inte-
gration by services as upstream suppliers to manufacturers).8 
Perhaps not surprising, given the limited role of foreign interme-
diates in services, foreign inputs are less important for services. 
Structural factors such as relative output per worker are also 
important, but skill intensity does not appear to be significant 
for services, though it is difficult to discount the possibility that 
this may to some extent reflect an aggregation effect that cannot 
differentiate between underlying high-skilled workers (such as 
software developers) and low-skilled workers (such as cleaners) 
within the industry grouping, as well as the different nature of 
the underlying integration process.
Promoting the creation of more sophisticated products has 
a positive effect only on manufacturing activities (not services), 
and surprisingly this is also the case for share of foreign direct 
investment (FDI) stocks in GDP, though that may reflect differ-
ences in the outward orientation of inward FDI (FDI in manufac-
turing to serve export markets as opposed to FDI in services to 
serve domestic markets, including final demand). As for emerg-
ing and developing economies, tariffs on imports also act as a 
drag on domestic value added in exports at the sectoral level, 
including the services sector, reflecting that in most economies 
upstream services content accounts for around a third of the 
value added of manufactured exports. Puzzlingly, increasing the 
share of exports covered by free trade agreements does not 
appear to lead to increased exports of value added.
Domestic supply chains are an important stepping stone 
for improving participation in global value chains
An important result of Kowalski and Lopez-Gonzalez’s (2016) 
study relating changes in domestic value added in exports to 
structural and policy factors is the co-incidence of domestic 
demand (a proxy for internal domestic supply chains) and for-
eign inputs in export-driven growth, highlighting the comple-
mentarity of the two for export growth. Further evidence of 
this complementarity is provided by Beverelli and others’ (2016) 
study of the relationship between upstream domestic supply 
chains and the foreign value added of exports (as a measure of 
GVC participation). They found a robust relationship between 
domestic value chains and future participation in GVCs. The 
study estimated that a 1 percentage point increase in domestic 
integration raises GVC backward integration by 0.5% over the 
short run.
FIGURE 3.4 Significant determinants of a change in domestic value added in exports for developed and emerging economies
Developed
Emerging
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Lagged foreign value added in industry exports (log)
Domestic demand (log of value)
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Source: Kowalski and Lopez-Gonzalez 2016.
Note: The figure shows the standardized coefficients of the determinants of changes in domestic value added in exports across agriculture, manufacturing, and 
services. The regression results are in table A3.1.1 in annex 3.1. No significance was found for depth of free trade agreements, share of exports covered by free 
trade agreements, or concentration of exports.
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Regional value chains as enablers of 
integration into global supply chains
The analysis so far offers two takeaway messages for countries 
looking to drive growth through integration in global value 
chains. The first is that imports can be an important driver of 
export growth. The second is that strong domestic supply chains 
provide an important launching pad for integration at a more 
global level. But another important takeaway message, often 
overlooked in the debate on GVCs, is that it matters where a 
country is located: it matters who its trading partners are, espe-
cially how integrated the partners are into regional and global 
value chains, and how far the country is from poles of economic 
activity (including markets). The composition of firms within an 
economy also matters. In most economies, particularly emerging 
economies, the majority of firms are small or medium size. The 
TABLE 3.1 Average wages and unit labor costs in manufacturing in selected developing and emerging economies, 2000 
and 2010
Region and country
2000 2010
Average wages 
(U S  dollars)
Unit labor cost  
(ratio of average wages 
to GDP per capita)
Average wages 
(U S  dollars)
Unit labor cost  
(ratio of average wages 
to GDP per capita)
Sub- Saharan Africa
Burundi — — 3,261 14.9
Cameroon 3,088 5.3 — —
Ethiopia 771 6.3 807 2.4
Ghana 1,832 4.9 — —
Kenya 2,118 5.2 2,854 3.6
Malawi 436 2.8 2,045 5.7
Mauritius 3,254 0.8 6,285 0.8
Senegal 3,680 7.8 6,450 6.5
South Africa 7,981 2.6 12,331 1.7
Tanzania 2,296 7.5 1,581 3.0
North Africa
Egypt 2,028 1.3 3,453 1.2
Morocco 4,123 3.2 6,654 2.4
Tunisia 4,066 1.8 5,455 1.3
Latin America
Brazil 5,822 1.6 10,918 1.0
Colombia 4,096 1.6 4,680 0.8
Mexico 8,048 1.2 7,310 0.8
Asia
Bangladesh — — 680 1.6
China 1,016 1.1 4,770 1.1
India 1,356 3.0 2,619 1.8
Indonesia 929 1.2 1,897 0.6
Malaysia 4,405 1.1 6,548 0.7
Viet Nam — — 1,727 1.3
Eastern Europe
Czech Republic 3,964 0.7 12,673 0.7
Latvia 3,689 1.1 9,191 0.8
Poland 5,829 1.1 10,162 0.8
Source: Ceglowski and others 2015.
Note:  — is not available.
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evidence points strongly to a lower likelihood of direct engage-
ment in trade the smaller the firm, reflecting additional barriers — 
lower probability of financing, lower economies of scale, higher 
relative fixed costs in dealing with regulation, and so on.
The fact that geography matters, coupled with the fact that 
strong domestic supply chains are important enablers of integra-
tion into global supply chains, leads the debate toward regional 
value chains as enablers. Currently the best statistical tool used 
to measure GVC integration comprehensively is the OECD–WTO 
Trade in Value-Added database, which has data on 63 countries. It 
provides strong evidence of increased integration in GVCs in most 
economies based on foreign value added in exports, backward 
linkages, forward linkages, domestic value added in other coun-
tries’ exports, and standard GVC participation indices (figure 3.7).
Intraregional integration is unequal — and poor in Africa 
and Latin America
Although the coverage of countries in the OECD–WTO Trade 
in Value-Added database reflects a significant proportion of 
world output and world trade, it remains patchy in many regions, 
FIGURE 3.5 Evolution of unit labor costs and average wages, 2000 to 2010
Unit labor costs (ratio of average wages to GDP per capita)
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FIGURE 3.6 Determinants of change in domestic value added in exports, by sector
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Source: Kowalski and Lopez-Gonzalez 2016.
Note: The figure shows the standardized coefficients of the determinants of changes in the domestic value added in exports across agriculture, manufacturing, 
and services. The regression results are in table A3.1.1 in annex 3.1.
FIGURE 3.7 Changes in measures of integration into global value chains between 1995 and 2011 for the 63 economies in the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development–World Trade Organization Trade in Value-Added database
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notably Africa and Latin America. That limits its ability to pro-
vide insights on the nature of regional value chains. And where 
evidence does exist, it points strongly to very weak regional par-
ticipation (intraregional trade) outside Asia, Europe, and North 
America relative to extraregional trade (figure 3.8).
For regions not covered, notably for Africa, conventional 
(gross trade) statistics provide similar messages of weak regional 
integration (figure 3.9).
Moreover, where integration does occur, it is very much at the 
low-value end of GVCs for low-income countries, with exports of nat-
ural resources a significant form of integration and imports of inter-
mediate parts generally satisfying domestic demand (figure 3.10).
Poor integration is stifling convergence
Many countries that have integrated into GVCs have found them-
selves “captive participants,” experiencing difficulties in scaling 
up as a result of being locked into low-value tasks or as providers 
of commodities at the beginning of the value chain. With seem-
ingly limited ability to upgrade or diversify, they are often hos-
tage to price competition that keeps wages low or to the vaga-
ries of commodity prices (the resource curse). And this low-value 
form of integration appears to have, at least in part, inhibited 
greater improvement in economic convergence and stymied 
the upgrading process (figure 3.11). Most African economies, for 
example, have experienced only a 0–2 percentage point increase 
in GDP per capita in the last two decades relative to U.S. levels 
(although in some cases this amounts to doubling relative GDP 
per capita and sometimes even more, as in Angola’s case).
The stylized fact that a limited ability to integrate has gone 
hand in hand with limited income convergence can also be seen 
in measures of economic complexity, which provide a broad 
indication of a country’s upgrading (relative to other countries; 
Hausmann and others 2011).9 Most African economies show little 
change in ranking on these measures over the last two decades 
(where 1 indicates the highest complexity and 124 the lowest). 
Notable exceptions are North African economies, reflecting, at 
least in part, their geography — their proximity to European mar-
kets and value chains (figure 3.12).
The pattern is similar in Latin America and the Caribbean, 
with gains generally observed only in economies that improved 
their integration into North American value chains, such as Costa 
Rica (figure 3.13).
This contrasts starkly with countries in Asia and former transi-
tion economies in Eastern Europe (figure 3.14).
There is a positive correlation between change in economic 
complexity ranking over the last two decades (where a negative 
entry reflects greater economic complexity) and change in the 
foreign content of exports for countries with a more than 5 per-
centage point change in the foreign content of exports (figure 
3.15).10 But for countries with a smaller change in foreign content, 
the data point to a negative correlation.
Important here is the relative performance of countries in 
regions not well covered in the Trade in Value-Added data-
base and how representative they may be for their regions as 
a whole: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, and Costa Rica for 
Latin America and Saudi Arabia, South Africa, and Tunisia for the 
FIGURE 3.8 Intraregional and extraregional value chains, by region, for the 63 economies in the OECD–WTO Trade in 
Value-Added database, 1995 and 2011
Foreign value added content of gross exports as percent of total value added in exports
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FIGURE 3.9 Extraregional and intraregional trade in intermediates, 2014
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FIGURE 3.10 Composition of trade in low-income countries by intermediate and final goods, 2000–13
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FIGURE 3.11 Convergence in income per capita and exports in Africa relative to the United States between 1995 and 2014
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FIGURE 3.12 Economic complexity rankings in Africa, 1995 
and 2014
Rank (1 = highest, 124 = lowest)
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FIGURE 3.13 Economic complexity rankings in Latin 
America and the Caribbean, 1995 and 2014
Rank (1 = highest, 124 = lowest)
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Middle East and Africa. Costa Rica and Tunisia, for example, have 
seen a marked improvement in both integration and economic 
complexity rankings, but this largely reflects integration though 
North American and European production chains and their prox-
imity to those chains and markets. The same access for other 
countries in their regions may not be as straightforward.
But there is scope for improved intraregional integration
Of particular interest is the technological content of exports by 
region. As expected from interpreting figures 3.12 and 3.13, the 
technological content of exports is generally lower in Africa and 
Latin America than in other regions (figure 3.16), explaining in 
large part the poor performance in their economic complexity 
and, potentially, their economic convergence. But intraregional 
integration, where it does occur, is typically in higher value (tech-
nology) production. Intraregional trade is a small share of activity 
in these two regions, but it does point to the potential to improve 
regional integration by accelerating structural transformation and 
to the ability of intraregional integration to serve as a launching 
pad for greater global integration in higher value products.
For example, despite Africa’s abundance of primary com-
modities, they also account for an important share (35%) of the 
continent’s imports, indicating missed opportunities for sourc-
ing commodities internally. Intra-Africa trade has grown only 
modestly, from 11.0% of total exports in 2002 to 15.7% in 2014, 
emphasizing its considerable unrealized potential. The potential 
is similar in Latin America and the Caribbean. On (unweighted) 
average in 2014, countries in Latin America and the Caribbean 
(except for Mexico) exported 10 times more products within the 
region than to China, 7 times more to the European Union, and 2 
times more to the United States (table 3.2).
Further differences emerge in Latin America and the Carib-
bean by the size of exporting firms. Small and medium-size firms 
(almost 15,000) export predominantly within the region (figure 
3.17). Firm-level customs data show that the number of large firms 
that exported globally fluctuated between 500 and 1,000 in 2011 
(in Bolivia, Chile, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, and 
Uruguay). However, although increased exports by small and medi-
um-size firms can be an important driver of improved regional inte-
gration (and then global integration) as well as of improved inclu-
siveness, the contribution of their exports remains limited because 
of their low share in the overall value of exports (around 6% in 2011, 
much lower than in more developed regions such as Europe).11 And 
given the high concentration of commodity exports, the contribu-
tion of smaller firms as upstream suppliers to larger firms integrated 
within existing value chains is also likely to be limited, certainly when 
compared with other regions (OECD and World Bank 2015).
Enhancing regional trade agreements for regional trade
A surprising result from the analysis by Kowalski and Lopez- 
Gonzalez (2016) was the negative relationship between the share 
of exports covered by free trade agreements and value added 
in exports. A number of factors might explain this. For example, 
in emerging economies most extraregional trade is in commod-
ities, so diverging price effects could play a role. For example, 
higher values of commodity exports to countries with which the 
exporting country has no free trade agreement could create an 
inverse correlation. In addition, the scope and depth of regional 
trade agreements matter. In some regions, regional trade agree-
ments may have only limited benefits, if they are not also part 
of more comprehensive liberalization and facilitation policies, 
including multilateral and unilateral efforts.
Despite a proliferation of free trade agreements and regional 
trade agreements, nontariff barriers to trade remain high in 
Africa. Trade costs within Africa are only slightly lower than trade 
costs with the rest of the world, at 313–337% in ad valorem equiv-
alent (UNECA 2013). Indeed, as many as 10 African countries 
have higher trading costs with their intraregional partners than 
with the rest of the world. And in the median African country, 
document preparation to export or import takes 25% more time 
than in the rest of the world, while customs procedures are 30% 
more expensive (ESCAP and World Bank Trade Cost Database).
In the Asia–Pacific region, formal trade agreements may not 
have been a crucial driver of GVC trade at the intraregional level 
because economies are already connected through the regional 
production networks of multinational corporations. In addition, 
the effectiveness of regional trade agreements for exports 
appears to depend on the level of development of the exporting 
and importing economies. For example, regional trade agree-
ments appear to have a greater impact for low-income countries 
when exporting to high-income countries than when exporting 
to another low-income country.
FIGURE 3.14 Economic complexity rankings in Asia and 
Central Europe, 1995 and 2014
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Another possibility is that the multitude of overlapping free 
trade agreements and regional trade agreements impede 
rather than promote exports by adding to the complexity of 
managing trade, particularly for small and medium-size firms, 
for which barriers to entry are already high. In general, higher 
intraregional trade is associated with fewer overlaps of regional 
trade agreements. For example, Europe, with the highest level 
of intraregional trade, also seems to have the simplest structure, 
whereas Latin America and Africa, with poor intraregional trade, 
have the most complex arrangements (figure 3.18).
National experience with value chain 
upgrading and integration: Automotive sector
There is no single solution to GVC policymaking. Country- 
specific factors shape how countries integrate into GVCs: where 
they are located, the size and relative income of their neighbors, 
their relative income, the structure of their economy, the scope 
and nature of trade agreements, and endowments of physical 
and human capital, to name but a few. So GVC policymaking 
requires a whole supply chain approach, which is largely country 
FIGURE 3.15 Correlation of change in economic complexity rankings and change in foreign value-added content of 
exports between 1995 and 2014
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FIGURE 3.16 Regional exports by share of technological intensity, 2014
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specific. That makes it useful to draw lessons from actual country 
experiences. This section does that by synthesizing the results of 
questionnaires developed by the OECD Development Centre to 
target policy measures in the automotive sector.
Although the automotive industry is highly concentrated, with 
only a few countries (companies) contributing to global produc-
tion, its value chain is especially fragmented, both geographically 
and by tasks (research and development, design, testing, and 
assembly and production), with significant upstream chains. In 
all regions the automotive industry contributes no more than a 
third of overall final export value, less than services in all regions 
except Asia, where the automotive industry contributes mar-
ginally more (figure 3.19). In Latin America, services contribute 
nearly twice as much (more than 40%) as the automotive sector.
The high fragmentation in the industry has provided broad 
scope for integration for a variety of countries — and not just 
those with a significant motor vehicle industry. That, in turn, 
shapes the policy tools for improving the nature and space of 
integration. And in many countries — especially those with 
FIGURE 3.17 Number of exporters in Latin America and the 
Caribbean by main export destination, 2011
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TABLE 3.2 Number of exported products by destination 
from countries in Latin America and the Caribbean, 2014
Source country
Destination region or country
Latin 
America 
and 
Caribbean China
European 
Union
United 
States
Antigua and Barbuda 17 — 4 11
Argentina 3,358 359 1,488 1,333
Bahamas 17 4 8 45
Barbados 906 40 259 475
Belize 75 5 26 85
Bolivia, Plurinational 
State of 566 51 278 273
Brazil 3,779 1,402 2,937 2,786
Chile 2,932 327 1,472 1,291
Colombia 3,176 277 1,375 1,762
Costa Rica 2,791 273 1,033 1,690
Dominican Rep. 2,281 203 1,223 2,151
Ecuador 1,883 109 940 1,052
El Salvador 2,442 44 466 1,149
Guatemala 3,198 113 637 1,361
Guyana 471 29 94 294
Honduras 1,485 757 682 1,531
Jamaica 470 38 252 337
Mexico 3,756 1,401 2,830 4,052
Nicaragua 1,837 52 304 923
Panama 289 32 66 156
Paraguay 968 63 408 287
Peru 3,034 249 1,599 1,772
Saint Lucia 355 6 188 848
Uruguay 1,367 108 786 453
Venezuela, RB 920 16 168 618
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean using 
data from the UN Comtrade database.
Note: A product is defined at the six-digit code level in the Harmonized 
System.
 — is not available.
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FIGURE 3.18 Selected regional and megaregional agreements, 2016
Transatlantic Trade and
Investment Partnership
EU28
European
Free Trade
Association Central
European
Free Trade
Agreement
Belt and Road Initiative
Eurasian
Customs
Union/
Eurasian
Economic
Union
South Asian
Free Trade 
Area
Regional
Comprehensive
Economic
Partnership
Association of
Southeast Asian
Nations
Trans-Pacific
Strategic Economic
Partnership
West African
Economic and
Monetary Union
Southern
African
Customs
Union
Southern
African
Development
Community
Economic
Community of
West African
States
Central African
Economic and
Monetary
Community
East African
Community
Arab
Maghreb
Union
Tripartite Free Trade Area
Common Market
for Eastern and
Southern Africa
European Single Market
North
American
Free Trade
Agreement
Trans-Pacific
Partnership
Community of
Latin American and
Caribbean States
Andean
Community
Latin American
Integration Association
Central American
Common Market
Bolivarian Alliance
for the Peoples
of Our America
Caribbean
Community
Pacific
Alliance
MERCOSUR
Gulf
Cooperation
Council
Source: OECD and UNCTAD forthcoming.
Note: The size of circles is proportional to the number of members that are parties to the agreement. Dashed lines indicate selected announced megaregional 
initiatives.
FIGURE 3.19 Gross exports of motor vehicles and parts by region and origin of value added, 2011
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negligible automotive sectors, but also those with large automo-
tive sectors — a strong policy focus is on the upstream part of the 
motor vehicle chain, where two-thirds to three-quarters of total 
value is created.
Of the 15 countries that responded to the OECD question-
naire, 5 are implementing targeted programs for the industry 
(Brazil, Colombia, France, Morocco, and Uruguay), four follow 
a horizontal approach (Costa Rica, Czech Republic, Mexico, 
and Turkey), and the rest, with small automotive industries, are 
focusing on linkage opportunities through other activities (Chile, 
Dominican Republic, Ethiopia, Ireland, Peru, and Singapore).
Targeted programs
Even in these specific categories, countries adopt different 
approaches to improve growth (table 3.3), often in parallel with 
broader multidimensional strategies (table 3.4). For example, 
TABLE 3.3 Main characteristics of targeted programs to promote the automotive industry in selected countries, 2014
Characteristic Brazil Colombia France Morocco Uruguay
Program name Inovar-Autoa Production 
Transformation 
Program
Plan Automobile Pact for Industrial 
Resurgence–
Automotive
Automotive Industry 
Export Promotion 
Regime
Responsible 
Institution
Ministry of Development, 
Industry and Foreign Trade
Ministry of Trade, 
Industry and Tourism
Ministry of Economic 
Regeneration and 
E-economy
Ministry of Industry, 
Trade, Investment and 
E-economy
Ministry of Industry, 
Energy, and Mining
Timeframe 2013–17 2009–32 Began in 2012, no 
termination date
2009–15 1992 (expired in 2015 
following World Trade 
Organization rules)
Objective
Strengthening 
national supply 
chain
Strengthen national supply 
chain (reaching a minimum 
investment of 1% of gross 
revenues net of taxes of 
qualified companies)
Achieve revenues 
(including exports) of 
at least $3.4 billion and 
exports of $1.1 billion 
and create at least 
33,000 jobs by 2032
Strengthen linkages 
among local suppliers
Increase GDP by 
12 billion dirhams and 
create 70,000 new 
jobs by 2015; setup 
second- and third-tier 
factories
Promote exports 
in certain industrial 
segments, mostly 
focused on 
MERCOSUR
Green targets Increase energy efficiency 
of vehicles (efficiency goal 
of 1.82 megajoules per 
kilometer for all cars sold in 
the country by 2017)
Develop affordable 
green vehicles
Innovation Increase research and 
development and engineering 
capacities (0.5% of gross 
revenues from sales of goods 
and services, matching with 
grants from the National 
Fund for Scientific and 
Technological Development)
Promote innovation 
through the Center 
for Technological 
Development of the 
Automotive Industry
Increase innovation 
content
Territorial 
dimension
National initiative National initiative, 
in coordination 
with regional 
competitiveness 
commissions
National initiative 
in coordination with 
local authorities
National initiative, 
with territorial 
dimension (Tanger, 
Keintra, and 
Casablanca)
National initiative
Budget — — 1.4 billion euros — —
Monitoring and 
evaluation
Brazilian Agency for Industrial 
Development is in charge 
of developing a monitoring 
system for the program
National Planning 
Department is in 
charge of monitoring 
and evaluation
No evaluation 
foreseen
A monitoring 
committee with 
private and public 
stakeholders has been 
established
No evaluation carried 
out or foreseen
Links http://inovarauto.mdic.gov 
.br/
www.ptp.com.co www.redressement 
-productif.gouv.fr 
/plan-soutien-a-filiere 
-automobile
www.emergence 
.gov.ma/MMM 
/Automobile/Pages 
/prqMaroc.aspx
Source: Author’s compilation based on country responses to the OECD questionnaire, “Targeted Programmes to Promote the Automotive Industry.”
Note:  — is not available.
a. In November 2016 the World Trade Organization ruled that this program’s subsidies were illegal; it is currently being reformulated.
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TABLE 3.4 Multi-institution and multidimensional policy mix targeted to the automotive industry, 2014
Type of incentive and  
country/responsible institution
Description/ 
beneficiaries Conditions Innovation content
Finance
Fiscal incentives
Brazil, Ministry of Industry and Foreign 
Trade
Multinational and domestic 
companies
Minimum requirements of research and 
development and investments in engineering 
and business information technology
Development of domestic 
technology; adoption of 
foreign frontier technology
Colombia, Bancoldex Domestic companies No No
France, Ministry of Research All companies carrying out research 
and development
No All innovation activities
Morocco, Ministry of Economy and 
Finance
Total exemption for five years for 
all companies located in special 
economic zones
Beneficiaries need to be located in special 
economic zones
No
Uruguay Tax credit linked to export 
performance
Local content requirement (20% of 
national value added)
No
Matching funds/grants
Colombia, Innpulsa Colciencias Domestic companies, specific line for 
small and medium-size firms
Cooperation among local suppliers Adaptation to domestic 
market
France, Ministry of Economy All companies carrying out research 
and development on future cars
No Future-oriented research and 
affordable green vehicles
Morocco State contribution of up to 10% of 
total investment
Beneficiaries need to be located in special 
economic zones
No
Skills
Brazil, Ministry of Industry and 
Education)
Technical, vocational, and higher 
education
Cooperation among private sector, local 
universities, and training institutes
—
Colombia, National Learning Service 
and Centre for Technological 
Development of Automotive Industry
— — —
Morocco Creation of training institute for skills 
for the automotive sector; grants for 
training
Partnerships with private sector —
Business services
Brazil, Brazilian Agency for Export 
Promotion
Domestic and multinational 
companies
The company should operate in Brazil (or 
be willing to relocate)
—
Colombia, Bancoldex Domestic companies — —
Morocco, Industrial Platforms offer a 
one-stop shop for business services
— — —
Demand-side support
Public procurement
Brazil, Ministry of Planning and Agrarian 
Development
Multinational and domestic 
companies
Companies capable of giving after-sale 
assistance over all national territory
Special incentives for 
adaptation to local markets
Colombia, Agency for Efficient 
Purchase
Domestic companies No Special incentives for 
adaptation to local markets
France Domestic companies 25% of purchased cars are hybrid or 
electric
Green cars
Other
France, Ministry of Environment Taxes on high emission vehicles and 
fiscal incentives to buy green cars
— Green cars
Standards
Brazil, National Institute for Metrology, 
Quality and Technology
— — —
Source: Author’s compilation based on country responses to the OECD questionnaire, “Targeted Programmes to Promote the Automotive Industry.”
Note:  — is not available.
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Mexico and Turkey, with relatively large automotive industries, 
are developing strong assembly capacities with an empha-
sis on adding value though higher (quality) upstream domestic 
value chains. Some countries are strengthening domestic indus-
trial capacities, such as Inovar-Auto in Brazil,12 the Production 
Transformation Program in Colombia, and the Plan Automobile 
in France. Another approach is to capitalize on FDI; Morocco’s 
target is to increase the attraction of FDI in second- and third-
tier upstream operations, while Colombia is looking at devel-
oping domestic technological capabilities. Another approach 
is to strengthen export capacities, as in Uruguay, by upgrading 
through free trade agreement (MERCOSUR) chains.
The approaches also differ in time horizons. The Colombian 
program is part of a long-term (2032) strategy of production 
transformation. Brazil and Morocco follow multiyear planning, 
while France has no predetermined end date. Uruguay ended its 
regime in 2015 in line with WTO requirements.
Countries have set job targets (Colombia and Morocco), export 
targets (Brazil, Colombia), or investment targets (Brazil). Brazil and 
France have targets linked to “green” cars and sustainable devel-
opment. Brazil and Colombia also target technological develop-
ment and innovation. Colombia, for example, has a new Center for 
Technological Development of the Automotive Industry.
Horizontal strategies
Similarly heterogeneous strategies can be observed in coun-
tries that identified the automotive industry as a priority area 
within a broader horizontal strategy (Costa Rica, Czech Repub-
lic, Mexico, and Turkey) rather than as a targeted strategy. In the 
Czech Republic, for example, the National Incentive Scheme, 
which covers manufacturing, technology, and business services, 
sets out the conditions for attracting FDI — tax incentives, grants 
for job creation and training, preferential rates for land and 
infrastructure use, and grants for capital investment. But it also 
sets conditions for the investors — notably job creation targets 
(table 3.5).
In Mexico, a variety of horizontal programs can benefit the 
automotive sector (table 3.6). They include programs that sup-
port the development and uptake of information and commu-
nication technologies (PRODIAT and PROSOFT) and incentives 
for innovation (CONACYT), for strengthening local suppliers 
(NAFIN), and for attracting FDI and promoting regional develop-
ment (ProMexico).
Turkey introduced an investment incentives system in 2012 
with the objectives of promoting production transformation and 
specialization in higher value-added activities, increasing jobs, 
and reducing territorial disparities. The system targets both 
domestic and foreign companies and includes four categories 
of incentives by type of investment: general, regional (broken 
down into six regions based on socioeconomic criteria), large 
scale, and strategic. Each includes a different mix of incen-
tives (table 3.7). The different schemes are applied taking into 
account the characteristics of the region in which the investment 
is made.
TABLE 3.5 Policy mix of the National Incentive Scheme, Czech Republic, 2014
Policy mix • Corporate income tax relief
• Partial corporate income tax relief
• Job creation grants
• Training and retraining grants
• Site support
• Cash grant on capital investment
Beneficiaries Manufacturing firms Technology centers Business support 
services centers
Conditions Regular ▼
Minimum investment 
of 100 million koruna 
($5 million) within three 
years. This limit is 
reduced in regions with 
high unemployment.
Investors’ own equity 
must equal at least half 
the investment.
Minimum investment 
in new machinery 
of 50 million koruna 
($2.5 million).
Strategic ▼
Minimum investment 
of 500 million koruna 
($25 million) within 
three years.
Minimum investment 
of 250 million koruna 
($12.5 million) in new 
machinery.
The investor must create 
at least 500 new jobs.
Regular ▼
Minimum investment 
of 10 million koruna 
($0.5 million) within 
three years.
Investors’ own equity 
must equal at least half 
of the investment.
Minimum investment 
of 5 million koruna 
($0.25 million) in new 
machinery.
The investor must create 
at least 40 new jobs.
Strategic ▼
Minimum investment 
of 200 million koruna 
($10 million) within 
three years.
Minimum investment 
of 100 million koruna 
($5 million) in new 
machinery.
The investor must create 
at least 120 new jobs.
Regular ▼
Creation of at least 
40 new jobs at software 
development centers.
Creation of at least 
100 new jobs at other 
business support 
services centers (shared 
services centers and 
high-tech repair 
centers).
Eligible costs Long-term assets, when the value of machinery equals at least half the value of acquired assets.
Maximum 
state aid
40% of total eligible costs (30% in Southwest 
regions and for investment in low-tech sectors)
40% of total eligible costs.
Source: Author’s compilation based on country responses to the OECD questionnaire, “Targeted Programmes to Promote the Automotive Industry.”
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TABLE 3.6 Horizontal programs that can support the automotive sector in Mexico, 2014
Characteristic
Technological development Promoting 
innovation  
CONACYT
Financing for 
suppliers  
NAFIN
Attracting foreign 
direct investment 
ProMexicoPRODIAT PROSOFT
Objectives Business services, 
training, certifications, 
and fiscal incentives to 
allow smaller firms to 
become suppliers of 
larger companies
Promoting use of 
information and 
communication 
technologies to 
increase productivity
Fund for technological 
development and 
innovation
Financing for working 
capital and fixed-
asset acquisition 
to suppliers of any 
industry to promote 
growth and increase 
local content
Financial incentives 
to attract foreign 
direct investment and 
promote national and 
regional development
Year of introduction 2009 2008 2009 — —
Time of frame Three-year program, 
but with annual 
budget approval
— Budget is approved 
annually by congress
Upon exhaustion of 
current budget
—
Main responsible 
institution
Ministry of Economy Ministry of Economy National Council 
for Science and 
Technology
NAFIN (development 
bank for small and 
medium-size firms)
Ministry of Economy
Territorial dimensions Federal Federal Federal Federal Federal with matching 
resources from states
Budget 200 million pesos 
approved in 2014 
($154 million)
700 million pesos 
approved in 2014 
($54 million)
4 billion pesos 
approved in 2014 
($308 million)
500 million pesos 
($385 million)
—
Links www.economia.gob.mx 
/mexico-emprende 
/programas/7107 
-programa-para-el 
-desarrollo-de-las 
-industrias-de-alta 
-tecnologia-prodiat 
-para-el-ejercicio 
-fiscal-2012
www.prosoft.economia 
.gob.mx/
www.conacyt.mx 
/index.php/fondos-y 
-apoyos/programa 
-de-estimulos-a-la 
-innovacion
www.nafin.com 
/portalnf/content 
/sobre-nafinsa 
/sala-de-prensa 
/boletin_15_14.html
www.economia.gob.mx 
/conoce-la-se 
/programas-se 
/informes-de 
-evaluaciones-externas 
/promexico
Source: Author’s compilation based on country responses to the OECD questionnaire, “Targeted Programmes to Promote the Automotive Industry.”
Note:  — is not available.
TABLE 3.7 Turkey’s investment incentives system, 2014
Incentive
General 
investment 
incentives
Regional 
investment 
incentives
Large-scale 
investment 
incentives
Strategic 
investment 
incentives
Value-added tax exemption ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔
Customs duty exemption ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔
Tax reduction ✔ ✔ ✔
Social security premium support (employers’ share) ✔ ✔ ✔
Income tax withholding allowance ✔ ✔ ✔
Social security premium support (employees’ share) ✔ ✔ ✔
Land allocation ✔ ✔ ✔
Interest rate support ✔ ✔
Value-added tax refund (with minimum investment of 500 million 
Turkish lira)
✔
Source: Author’s compilation based on country responses to the OECD questionnaire, “Targeted Programmes to Promote the Automotive Industry.”
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Broader policies supporting upstream integration
Even in countries with only small upstream providers to the 
automotive sector, such as Ireland, horizontal programs can be 
important. Enterprise Ireland, the agency developing Irish enter-
prises in world markets, provides direct support (subject to EU 
state aid guidelines) to foster high-potential startups by offering 
research and development grants and tools for expansion, inter-
nationalization, capacity development, and productivity. In addi-
tion, Ireland’s global sourcing strategy develops strong domes-
tic supplier chains to multinational enterprises in the country. 
In Chile and Peru, both net importers of vehicles, the focus is 
on developing upstream capacities in copper, rubber products 
(tires), design, and textiles.
Special economic zones
Several countries also reported using special economic zones, 
including Morocco, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic and 
Colombia. Morocco has targeted the broader automotive 
sector through the creation of integrated industrial platforms. 
Tanger Automotive City and Kenitra Automotive City are linked 
to Tanger and Casablanca special economic zones, which host 
automotive assembly multinational corporations to create local 
clusters of competences.
Costa Rica’s FDI attraction policy has been linked to special 
economic zones. It also promotes local suppliers (Costa Rica 
Provee) and supports science and industry links to increase the 
innovation content of domestic companies.
A variety of upstream suppliers to the automotive industry 
have established manufacturing operations in special economic 
zones in the Dominican Republic. In addition to fiscal incentives, 
foreign companies are attracted to skilled human resources in 
disciplines related to the automotive industry, such as electri-
cal and electronics manufacturing and injection molding. A free 
trade regime, managed by the National Free Zones Council, 
offers fiscal incentives to attract domestic and foreign compa-
nies that manufacture goods or provide export services. The 
council also establishes links between companies inside and 
outside the special economic zones, and the government has 
invested in promoting human capital in disciplines related to 
the main industries operating in the special economic zones (in 
partnership with the National Institute for Vocational Training). 
The Dominican Republic is now shifting toward technology- 
intensive sectors and higher value-added activities, including 
the automotive industry, capitalizing on preferential access to 
the U.S. and EU markets.
Conclusions
There is no unique solution or approach to capitalizing on GVCs. 
Who or where a company is matters almost as much as the what 
and how, and indeed largely, determines how it integrates. Also 
clear, certainly from the upgrading stories in many economies, is 
that companies are not necessarily static, and countries can take 
many actions to overcome barriers to integration.
Barriers to trade, whether at the border or behind the border, 
can severely impede integration, but they are not the only obsta-
cles. Countries need strong domestic supply chains coupled 
with unhindered access to imports. And it is no coincidence that 
economies making inroads in GVCs (as shown here for the auto-
motive sector) focus policy as much on the improved function-
ing of these domestic chains as on improved access to foreign 
markets. Strong domestic chains are almost a precondition for 
sustainable and long-term success in GVCs. The spoils of export 
success accrue to different sectors, most notably to small and 
medium-size firms, which struggle for direct access to foreign 
markets, especially in emerging economies. Domestic chains 
also provide greater scope for functional upgrading. In many 
economies policy and partnerships nudge lead firms toward 
developing stronger competitiveness through technology trans-
fers and training and greater scope for upstream incumbents to 
also upgrade through process and product upgrading.
But for many economies the road to success is not exclusively 
in their own hands. Where the countries are matters as much 
as who they are, and certainly for Sub- Saharan Africa and, to a 
lesser extent, Latin America, distance from more developed and 
higher income markets matters, especially for landlocked econo-
mies. And just as strong domestic chains matter for global inte-
gration, so too do strong regional chains. For many economies, 
regional chains are a necessary intermediate step.
It is possible, of course, that even without targeted action, 
the benefits from GVCs will begin to trickle down — in much the 
same way that GVCs are trickling inward in central China from the 
coast. This could happen as countries in Africa and Latin Amer-
ica that are on the periphery of richer regions begin to develop 
as a result of larger spillovers southward from the European and 
North American poles of activity and westward from Asian poles 
of activity. But there is no guarantee that this will happen, espe-
cially with trade slowing and signs emerging that the GVC engine 
may be stalling, especially with growing calls for protectionism in 
richer markets and emerging signs of reshoring, and with auto-
mation on the horizon.
Worryingly, the evidence suggests that new free trade agree-
ments that overlap with existing arrangements may not improve 
regional trade, especially if they are not broad in their liberaliza-
tion and facilitation policies. It is perhaps no coincidence that in 
Sub- Saharan Africa and Latin America, with significant shares of 
small and medium-size firms and relatively low regional integra-
tion, overlapping agreements create a spaghetti bowl — adding 
barriers that many firms are ill equipped to deal with. In this 
respect, the more comprehensive multilateral agreements such 
as the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa–East 
African Community–Southern African Development Community 
Tripartite Free Trade Area, with 26 African countries and 58% 
of the continent’s GDP, bode well. Similar arguments could be 
made for Asia, but the starting point here differs. Integration has 
been facilitated by significant FDI flows, drawn in part by lower 
unit labor costs, and significant poles of higher income, with mul-
tinationals better equipped to handle the multiple layers of free 
trade agreements.
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Improving regional integration may also help address com-
petitiveness gaps that exacerbate those caused by geography 
(and indeed costs related to poor infrastructure). This is espe-
cially important since entry to GVCs through cheap labor alone 
does not seem to be enough. What appears to matter is the 
combination of labor and productivity, in other words unit labor 
costs. Despite, for example, the recent rise in China’s labor costs, 
its unit labor costs appear to have remained competitive with 
those of Sub- Saharan Africa and Latin America. It is important, 
therefore, to make inroads in improving productivity, particu-
larly through FDI, bringing much needed capital, technology, 
and know-how. But FDI has to be coupled with policies that can 
extract maximum spillovers through robust domestic supply 
chains, including a more robust entrepreneurial environment.
Efforts to increase and preserve participation in GVCs in the 
years to come may face a more difficult economic environment, 
reinforcing the need to better understand the challenges, the 
drivers of success, and the barriers that impede it. The diversity 
of success stories and the diversity of failures point to pragma-
tism and a realization that there is no one-size-fits-all approach. 
Different pathways exist, each delivering specific results and 
entailing a different balance of risks and gains, depending on the 
characteristics of a country, including its market structure and 
policy approach. For developing countries today, it is crucial to 
look forward and anticipate changes in the global organization 
of production in order to adapt to the future of production and 
services delivery.
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ANNEX 3.1
Result, variables, and data sources for the study 
by Kowalski and Lopez-Gonzales (2016)
The annex tables present information and detailed results from 
the Kowalski and Lopez-Gonzales (2016) model analysis of 
changes in domestic value added in exports.
TABLE A3.1.1 Determinants of changes in the domestic value added in exports (standardized coefficients)
Variable
(1) (2) (3)
All 
countries
Developed 
economies
Emerging 
economies
Capital–labor ratio (log) 0.0739***
(0.0163)
0.0280
(0.0195)
0.112***
(0.0299)
Skill intensity 0.0928***
(0.0354)
0.118***
(0.0343)
0.844
(1.027)
Relative output per worker 0.0978***
(0.0276)
0.0802***
(0.0291)
–0.119
(0.138)
Share of foreign direct investment stocks in GDP 0.00512***
(0.00172)
0.0103***
(0.00245)
–0.00497
(0.00315)
Rule of law –0.0250
(0.0157)
0.0303
(0.0208)
–0.0615**
(0.0280)
Lagged foreign value added in industry exports (log) 0.151***
(0.0177)
0.150***
(0.0196)
0.139***
(0.0349)
Tariffs charged (log) –0.0507***
(0.00794)
–0.0586***
(0.0105)
–0.0131
(0.0114)
Share of exports covered by free trade agreements –0.00930
(0.00635)
0.00403
(0.00689)
0.0256
(0.0186)
Index of depth of free trade agreements 0.00222
(0.00581)
–0.00134
(0.00669)
–0.00414
(0.0120)
Sophistication of exports 0.0257*
(0.0139)
0.0119
(0.0149)
0.0527**
(0.0250)
Concentration of exports –0.00507
(0.00976)
–0.0171
(0.0119)
0.0167
(0.0206)
Domestic demand (log of value) 0.327***
(0.0276)
0.312***
(0.0322)
0.397***
(0.0734)
Distance to economic activity (log) –0.130***
(0.0250)
–0.105***
(0.0289)
–0.195***
(0.0504)
Constant –0.167***
(0.0357)
–0.206***
(0.0418)
–0.138
(0.226)
Number of observations 10,882 7,394 3,488
R-squared 0.649 0.641 0.667
Number of repeating sections 1,838 1,250 588
 *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
Source: Kowalski and Lopez-Gonzales 2016.
Note: Numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors. Regressions are at the sectoral level using a fixed-effects specification that restricts the variance to the 
country-sector dimension and thus captures the impact of changes in the independent variables on the dependent variable. This setup controls for time-invariant 
country-sector omitted variables. See table A3.1.2 for a description of the variables and table A3.1.3 for descriptive statistics.
92 • Measuring and Analyzing the Impact of GVCs on Economic Development
TABLE A3.1.2 Description of variables
Variable Description Source
Domestic value added in exports (log) Domestic value added used by industry to 
produce exports
OECD Inter-Country Input-Output Tables
Capital–labor ratio (log) Aggregate economywide capital-to-labor ratio Penn World Tables
Skill intensity High-skilled workers divided by low skilled 
workers (aggregate)
International Labour Organization
Relative output per worker Country output per worker divided by average 
global output per worker
International Labour Organization
Share of foreign direct investment stocks 
in GDP
Aggregate share of foreign direct investment 
stock in country
United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development
Rule of law Worldwide Governance Indicators
Lagged foreign value added in industry 
exports (log)
Foreign value-added use by industry to produce 
exports
OECD Inter-Country Input-Output Tables
Tariffs charged (log) Weighted average applied tariffs (weights from 
BACI data)
Trade Analysis Information System
Share of exports covered by free trade 
agreements
Weighted average trade covered by free trade 
agreements if countries share an agreement all 
their exports are considered to be covered
Trade Analysis Information System and Design of 
Trade Agreements Database
Index of depth of free trade agreements Count of deep provisions in free trade agreements Design of Trade Agreements Database
Sophistication of exports EXPY variable calculated following Hausmann-
Herfindahl indicators of concentration normalized
BACI
Concentration of exports EXPY variable calculated following Hausmann-
Herfindahl indicators of concentration normalized
BACI
Domestic demand (log of value) Domestic value added from industry that is 
consumed domestically
OECD Inter-Country Input-Output Tables
Distance to economic activity (log) Distances weighted domestic value added in 
consumption of other countries
Centre d’Etudes Prospectives et d’Informations 
Internationales Geography
Source: Kowalski and Lopez-Gonzales 2016.
TABLE A3.1.3 Descriptive statistics
Variable
Number of 
observations Mean
Standard 
deviation Minimum Maximum
Domestic value added in exports (log) 14,302 6.58192 2.28415 –9.876943 13.53801
Capital–labor ratio (log) 14,518 11.70262 0.88856 8.13445 12.84867
Skill intensity 14,450 10.62023 43.35979 0.07450 358.80000
Relative output per worker 14,518 1.00000 0.60184 0.05052 3.59928
Share of foreign direct investment stocks in GDP 14,042 5.12193 7.57578 –16.40000 67.20000
Rule of law 12,036 0.79489 0.86737 –1.19000 1.98000
Lagged foreign value added in industry exports (log) 12,118 4.80752 2.81482 –12.79376 12.37180
Tariffs charged (log) 14,280 1.35067 0.75808 0.00000 3.34222
Share of exports covered by free trade agreements 11,628 0.56681 0.27757 0.00000 0.99390
Index of depth of free trade agreements 14,518 112.60660 116.49580 0.00000 366.00000
Sophistication of exports 14,076 9.69665 0.26274 8.26598 10.38535
Concentration of exports 11,832 0.05517 0.10275 0.00288 0.68158
Domestic demand (log of value) 14,756 11.81066 1.86974 7.47943 16.33693
Distance to economic activity (log) 14,518 13.40891 0.32243 12.43798 13.91208
Source: Kowalski and Lopez-Gonzales 2016.
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Notes
1. According to the World Bank’s 2016 Logistics Performance Index, 6 
of the 10 lowest ranked countries were in Africa: Somalia, Mauritania, 
Equatorial Guinea, Sierra Leone, Lesotho, and Zimbabwe.
2. An additional complication should be recognized in attempting to 
look for signs of functional upgrading (in the classic case where an 
existing firm upgrades to a higher value part of the chain) using offi-
cial national aggregated (and not firm- level) statistics. These data 
typically aggregate firms on the basis of their core activity, usually 
measured on the basis of their main source of value added. So firms 
that engage in functional upgrading may appear in different indus-
trial activity codes over two periods, hampering the ability to observe 
their evolution. But this is not necessarily a complicating feature when 
investigating functional upgrading at the national (rather the firm) 
level.
3. Timmer and others (2014) showed that emerging economies special-
ize in capital-intensive activities, which suggests that financial devel-
opment can be important for GVC integration and upgrading. Harri-
son, Lin, and Xu (2014) showed that the key factors explaining Africa’s 
disadvantage at the firm level are lack of infrastructure, low access to 
finance, and political competition.
4. A fixed-effect model is used that controls for country- sector and year 
characteristics. This restricts the variance of the dependent variable 
to temporal changes in domestic value added embodied in exports 
and controls for sector and country effects that do not vary over time. 
While this reduces the incidence of unobserved heterogeneity, con-
cern remains about possible correlations between lagged changes 
in the foreign value added used to produce exports and current 
changes in the specialization measures. If prior changes are correlated 
with current changes driven by a common trend, the estimates will 
be biased. Further checks to account for the dynamic nature of these 
processes (through the use of a difference generalized method of 
movements specification) confirmed the robustness of the results.
5. This variable does not overlap with the dependent variable since it 
captures value added engaged in different activities.
6. Interestingly, positive changes in the rule of law reduce rather than 
increase domestic value addition in emerging countries. Although this 
is at odds with the common perception that better institutions lead to 
better economic outcomes, it likely reflects threshold effects. In other 
words, when considering the relatively low current rating of emerging 
economies on the rule of law, a positive association of value-added 
exports with the rule of law may arise only after a certain threshold 
has been reached. Perhaps surprisingly, the analysis reveals no cor-
relation with inward FDI. This may reflect, at least in part, dispropor-
tionate investment in many emerging economies in existing (rather 
than greenfield) natural resource activities, coupled with volatile price 
effects.
7. A simple view of the capital–labor ratio can be given by the share of 
labor in overall value added relative to capital’s share. The capital–labor 
ratio (C/L) can be described simply as C/(C + L), where C is the return 
to capital and L the return to labor and C + L = value added (GDP). Unit 
labor costs reflect average wages divided by average productivity, or 
L/(C + L) or 1 – C/(C + L).
8. See also Lopez-Gonzalez, Meliciani, and Savona (2015).
9. The economic complexity indicator provides a broad measure of the 
relative complexity of products and countries by ranking the diversity 
of products produced by a country with products weighted by com-
plexity based on their ubiquity. Tracking movements over time can 
therefore provide insights into the relative upgrading (in complexity 
of production) of countries. Unweighted values of diversity and ubiq-
uity are initially defined as follows, with Mcp = 1 if country c produces 
product p, and Mcp = 0 otherwise:
Diversity = kc,0 = ∑p  Mcp (3.1)
Ubiquity = kp,0 = ∑c Mcp (3.2)
Weighted values are generated through an iterative procedure:
kc,n =
 1 ∑pMcp × kp,N–1 (3.3) kc,0
kp,n =
 1 ∑cMcp × kc,N–1 (3.4) kp,0
Inserting equation 3.4 into equation 3.3 gives:
kc,N =
 1 ∑pMcp
 1 ∑c’ Mc’p × kc’,N–2 (3.5) kc,0  kp,0
kc,N = ∑c’ kc’,N–2 ∑p 
Mcp Mc’p (3.6)
 kc,0 kp,0
and it follows that:
kc,N = ∑c’ 
~
Mcc’ kc’,N–2 (3.7)
where
~
Mcc’ = ∑p 
McpMc’p (3.8)
 kc,0 kp,0
Equation 3.7 is satisfied when kc,N = kc,N–2 = 1. This is the eigen-
vector of 
~
Mcc’ associated with the largest eigenvalue. Since this eigen-
vector is a vector of ones, it is not informative, and the eigenvector 
associated with the second largest eigenvalue ρ is taken. This is the 
eigenvector that captures the largest amount of variance in the system 
and is used as the measure of economic complexity. The economic 
complexity index (ECIc) for a given country c is therefore defined as:
ECIc = 
ρc – < ρ > (3.9)
 stdev (ρ)
where < > represents an average over all countries, stdev 
reflects the standard deviation of ρ over all countries, and ρc is the 
second-largest eigenvalue of 
~
Mcc’.
10. Some care is needed in interpreting the relationships between foreign 
value-added content and economic complexity, especially for deter-
mining any causality, partly reflecting the nature of economic com-
plexity measures — for example, increased specializations in natural 
resource exports are likely to generate lower rankings of complexity. 
In addition, the economic complexity rankings are based on gross 
trade statistics, so countries that integrate in low-value processing 
tasks at the end of complex products will, all other things equal, have 
higher economic complexity measures. Moreover, changes in the for-
eign value-added content of exports are a far from perfect measure of 
GVC integration. For example, countries that upgrade through stron-
ger upstream domestic content are likely to see declines in their for-
eign content but not necessarily lower GVC integration, which partly 
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explains China’s position. Equally, the upper and lower bound ranking 
of countries necessarily invalidates a linear relationship between the 
two measures, which explains the omission of the top 20 ranked coun-
tries in 1995 from the charts. Japan, Germany, and Switzerland, for 
example, whose foreign content of exports increased 6–10 percent-
age points over the period, retained their rankings as first, second, 
and third, almost throughout the period.
11. See, for example, the OECD–Eurostat Trade by Enterprise Char-
acteristics database (www.oecd.org/std/its/trade-by-enterprise 
-characteristics.htm).
12. In November 2016 the World Trade Organization ruled that Inovar’s 
subsidies were illegal; it is currently being reformulated. In addition, 
Brazil implemented a targeted program in 2014 to facilitate upstream 
integration (Productive Linkage Automotive Sector) by small and 
medium-size firms: the program includes targeted training by auto-
makers to enhance the production and innovation capacities of their 
suppliers. Mexico also introduced a technology development pro-
gram for industry in 2009 (PRODIAT) run by the Ministry of Economy 
to reduce the information gap between large companies and poten-
tial domestic suppliers. The program also offers financial support 
for certification to allow small and medium-size firms to operate as 
subcontractors.
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